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Of the controversies surrounding the turn-of-the-twentieth-century United States
Supreme Court, one which seems to dominate is the debate over whether the Court drew
from social Darwinism in its development and use of the so-called liberty of contract
doctrine. This controversy over the Court’s intellectual influences is further complicated
by the significant contention among scholars surrounding the meaning of social
Darwinism, its proponents, and its influence on late-nineteenth and early-twentieth
century American thought. I trace the development of the liberty of contract doctrine
through the Court’s minimum wage and maximum hours jurisprudence in order to
reexamine the Court for influences of social Darwinism. I argue that, in light of recent
scholarship on this view, social Darwinism seems to have played a very marginal role, if
any, in the Court’s jurisprudence. In fact, these cases, which have often been cited as
evidence that the Court was influenced by social Darwinism, contain very little rhetorical
evidence to support this assertion. However, despite this lack of evidence in the Court’s
opinions, the influence of social Darwinism should not be entirely dismissed because the
opinions may not provide enough insight into the justices’ worldviews to allow one to
assess the Court for extra-legal influences.
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Introduction

There are a number of controversies which surround the turn-of-the-century
Supreme Court. First, there is a debate regarding the activism of the Court. Second, with
respect to the debate over whether or not the Court was activist, there is significant
contention over the influences and sources from which the turn-of-the-century Court
drew in its jurisprudence. A number of scholars argue that the Court was influenced by
social Darwinism, while another group of scholars eschew this view by arguing that the
Court was influenced by libertarian notions grounded in American traditions that predated both Darwinism and social Darwinism. Though the debate over the Court’s
intellectual sources presents a significant barrier to assessing the Court’s activism, this
matter is further complicated by the fact that there is significant contention surrounding
the meaning of the term social Darwinism, the list of those who are proponents of this
view, and its influence on American thought. By examining recent scholarship on social
Darwinism and the rhetoric of the Court’s most significant turn-of-the-century minimum
wage and maximum hours jurisprudence, I will assess the claim that the Court was
influenced by social Darwinism through the prism of these controversies surrounding
both the Court and social Darwinism itself.

The Debate over the Turn-of-the-Century Court’s Activism and its Intellectual
Sources

The turn-of-the-century Supreme Court has been referred to as the laissez-faireera or Lochner-era Court, a reference that arises from an interpretation of the turn-of-the-
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century Court’s jurisprudence that casts the Court as an activist vehicle for the
institutionalization of social Darwinism and laissez-faire economics into constitutional
law. Evidence for this view, as the orthodox version of this narrative reveals, can clearly
be found in cases in which the Supreme Court eschewed legal principles, constitutional
precedent, and the Constitution itself in order to overturn laws that were viewed as
incompatible with the justices’ own economic and social philosophies (Chemerinsky
1997; Ducat 1996; Twiss 1942; Miller 1968; Kelly and Harbison 1963; Irons 1999;
Clinton 1994; Mendelson 1996). In addition, according to the orthodox view, the
underlying principles which fueled the Court’s departure from the past were evidenced by
the Court’s use of the doctrines of both liberty of contract and substantive due process
(Chemerinsky 1997; Ducat 1996; Twiss 1942; Miller 1968; Kelly and Harbison 1963;
Irons 1999; Clinton 1994; Mendelson 1996). Moreover, advocates of the orthodox thesis
identify cases such as Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) and Adkins v. Children’s
Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) as proof of this explanation (Irons 1999; Chemerinsky
1997; Ducat 1996; Miller 1968; Kelly and Harbison 1963; Twiss 1942). Specifically,
many of them call attention to Justice Holmes’ famous dissent in Lochner, in which he
indicts the Court’s majority for interpreting Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics into the
Constitution (Ducat 1996; Twiss 1942; Miller 1968; Kelly and Harbison 1963; Irons
1999).
However, a number of revisionist critics have rejected this orthodox view. In
general, these revisionist critics argue that a significant amount of evidence exists that
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demonstrates that the Court was neither activist nor driven by interpreting laissez-faire 1
or social Darwinism into the Constitution. Instead, the Court was firmly grounded in
traditional American philosophical and legal thought which placed an all-but-sacrosanct
status on the protection of liberty and property (Semonche 1978; Gillman 1993 and 1996;
Nedelsky 1990; McCurdy 1975).
Despite the significant dispute between the orthodox view and the revisionist
view with regard to whether the Court was indeed activist, these scholars agree that the
Court was out of step with the prevailing political and policy trends, which attempted to
cope with the immense social and economic changes that had accompanied
industrialization and the social problems that had developed from these changes.
Nevertheless, the central issue appears to stem from a disagreement over whether
following legal traditions prevented the Court from conforming with the progressive tide,
or whether it was a departure from these traditions that kept it out of step with the nascent
reform movement.
While social Darwinism has been offered as an explanation for the Court’s
departure from legal traditions (Chemerinsky 1997; Ducat 1996; Miller 1968; Irons 1999;
Clinton 1994; Mendelson 1996), revisionists argue that a conservative attachment to the
traditional notions of American liberty was what kept the Court from falling in lock-step
with the progressive movement (Semonche 1978; Gillman 1993 and 1996; Nedelsky
1990; McCurdy 1975). According to the revisionists, the orthodox view presents
problems regarding both the interpretation that the Court had eschewed legal traditions
and the use of social Darwinism to explain this departure. To illustrate, revisionists claim
1

However, though Michael les Benedict contends that the Court had indeed appealed to laissez-faire
notions, he argued that its appeal was firmly grounded in the American tradition and, thus, was not
indicative of activism (Benedict 1985).
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that the orthodox view is misguided in its interpretations of the Court’s behavior as
activist (Semonche 1978; Gillman 1993 and 1996; Nedelsky 1990; McCurdy 1975), a
criticism which is based on three premises. First, revisionists claim that the precedent for
the Court’s decisions in the Lochner era can be found throughout the Court’s nineteenthcentury jurisprudence (Semonche 1978; Gillman 1993 and 1996; Nedelsky 1990;
McCurdy 1975). Specifically, they claim, all one has to do is to look at the jurisprudence
of both Marshall and Taney to find examples (Gillman 1993 and 1996). Second, they
claim that the underlying philosophy of the Marshall and Taney Courts is the same
underlying philosophy of the Lochner-era Court—that is, that the protection of liberty as
enshrined in the Constitution is of greater concern than the shifting policy concerns of the
state or Federal governments (Gillman 1993 and 1996). The third premise is empirical;
this premise is that the Court was not activist because, though it overturned some
progressive legislation, it left the vast bulk of it intact (Warren 1913; McCloskey 1960;
McCurdy 1975).
Though the revisionist view is quite appealing in its substance, the criticism of
this view is quite devastating. First, critics of the revisionists view argue that the
revisionists have overstretched interpretive boundaries by arguing that the Lochner-era
Court was merely following the jurisprudential precedents of Marshall and Taney
(Clinton 1994; Mendelson 1996). In fact, though the revisionists may be justified in their
claim that the Marshall and Taney Courts were interested in protecting both liberty and
private property “in general” (Clinton 1994), to extrapolate from this observation that the
Lochner-era Court must therefore have adopted these same interests in their application
of substantive due process and liberty of contract seems rather audacious in light of
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Clinton’s criticism. According to these critics, neither Marshall’s nor Taney’s
jurisprudence approaches the Lochner-era Court’s liberal use of these illegitimate
doctrines of substantive due process and liberty of contract (Clinton 1994; Mendelson
1996) or suggests that they would have adopted such a limited view of legislative power;
nor is there evidence that they would have provided such a powerful weapon as the
doctrines of substantive due process and liberty of contract in order to broaden the
Court’s own power. Thus, the critics claim that the revisionists’ view of Marshall, Taney,
and the jurisprudence of the nineteenth century may be an excessively broad one. Indeed,
some suggest that there may be no factual basis from which to extrapolate.2
However, while most revisionists claim that the Court was following the
jurisprudential traditions of Marshall and Taney, some revisionists argue that the Court
may not have been out of touch with reform movements after all because it upheld more
progressive legislation than it overturned (Warren 1913; McCloskey 1960; McCurdy
1975). Critics such as Paul Kens, however, argue that this claim is weakened by the fact
that the Court overturned critical legislative victories for the progressive movement,
while the legislation which it left intact was minor by comparison (1991). Kens’
observation seriously weakens the revisionist view that the Court was not activist or
social Darwinist because it left most of the progressive legislation intact, suggesting that
the Court merely left the most benign reform legislation intact rather than overturning
every piece. However, though Kens’ view weakens the views of some revisionists, it
nonetheless gives further credibility to the arguments of other revisionists who argue that
the turn-of-the-century Court was out of touch with the rising progressive tide. Likewise,

2

According to Clinton, revisionists such as Gillman have given far too much weight to Marshall’s dicta
rather than to the law which emerged from his opinions (1994).
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Kens’ observation also confirms the claims of those who subscribe to the orthodox view
that the Court was hostile to progressive legislation.

The Debate Surrounding Social Darwinism

This lack of consensus surrounding the turn-of-the-century Court creates
significant barriers to its reevaluation for influences of social Darwinism. This task is
made even more difficult by the fact that there is significant contention surrounding the
historical scholarship on social Darwinism. The scholarship on social Darwinism presents
three principal views with respect to the meaning of the term and its influence, and to the
identification of its proponents. In the first view, social Darwinism is a social theory that
advocates a form of extreme brutal individualism underpinned by notions taken from
Charles Darwin’s theories of evolution and Herbert Spencer’s social views—themselves
derived from Spencer’s own evolutionary theory (Hofstadter 1944). This view, which
could be described as the orthodox view on social Darwinism, argues that social
Darwinism was an influential theory that had a considerable impact on American
conservative thought at the turn of the twentieth century (Hofstadter 1944). For example,
for orthodox historians such as Richard Hofstadter, social Darwinism served to bolster
laissez-faire capitalism and was widely influential to American business leaders at the
turn of the century (1944). The second view, which could be described as the revisionist
view, holds that social Darwinism is a myth (Bannister 1979). According to this
revisionist view presented by Robert Bannister, social Darwinism was neither the
predominant view at the turn of the century, nor was it influenced by Darwinism (1979).
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In fact, the revisionist view argues that Darwinism bolstered reform ideas rather than
brutal individualism or other extremist ideas. Additionally, the revisionist view
challenges the list of those characterized by earlier historians as social Darwinists
(Bannister 1979). Finally, the third view is that social Darwinism is a worldview, rather
than a social theory or ideology, and is indeed influenced by Darwin’s notions of
evolution (Hawkins 1997). In addition, this view, presented by Mike Hawkins, argues
that social Darwinism is constructed from a number of assumptions which are interrelated
and indeterminate, the most important of which is the assumption of scientific
determinism (1997). In addition, the evolution of social and psychological development
is taken by the social Darwinist to be analogous with the determinism in the evolutionary
processes which effect species change (Hawkins 1997). Moreover, echoing the orthodox
view, this last view maintains that social Darwinism was an influential worldview in
America and Europe at the turn of the century (Hawkins 1997). However, in contrast to
both the orthodox view and the revisionist view, Hawkins maintains that, social
Darwinism, because of its indeterminacies, is a highly versatile worldview (1997). Thus,
it could be adapted to a number of social theories and ideologies rather than only either
conservative or reformist theories or ideologies (1997). Therefore, according to this view,
social Darwinism was adaptable to both conservative and progressive views, a fact
reflected in turn-of-the-century American thought (Hawkins 1997).
Though there are a number of controversies surrounding the turn-of-the-century
Court, I wish to reexamine the role which social Darwinism may have occupied in its
jurisprudence. Specifically, I will trace the development of the liberty of contract doctrine
within the Court’s treatment of maximum hours and minimum wage legislation. I will
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argue that, in light of both Robert Bannister’s and Mike Hawkins’ scholarship and despite
the disagreement between the two scholars on the meaning of the term ‘social
Darwinism,’ its proponents, and its influence on American thought, the evidence that the
turn-of-the-century Court was influenced by social Darwinism appears weak at best. On
the one hand, the rhetorical evidence from at least one of the minimum wage / maximum
hours cases—Muller v. State of Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908)—suggests that the Court
may have been influenced by a social theory derived from Darwinian ideas. On the other
hand, however, none of the other significant cases from this line of jurisprudence
suggests that the Court was influenced by Darwin or by evolutionary ideas more
generally. Nevertheless, the influence of social Darwinism on the Court should not be
dismissed. Instead, in my view, especially in light of Hawkins’ scholarship on social
Darwinism, the issue requires further study, which may reveal more insight into the
underlying ideas which influenced the turn-of-the-century Court. In fact, the rhetoric
from the cases themselves—at least, those presented here—may not contain enough
information to provide the much-needed insights into the worldviews from which the
justices of the turn-of-the-century Court constructed their legal opinions. Thus, although
the Court may have been influenced by social Darwinism, there does not appear to be any
significant evidence of this view, at least in the line of cases which have been most often
cited as evidence of such an influence.
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Social Darwinism in The Court? Minimum Wage / Maximum Hours Jurisprudence,
the Liberty of Contact, and the Historical Context

The Historical Context

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the United States was in the midst of a
number of deep, intense, and rapid structural changes which were reflected in many areas
of American life. Because the American economy was increasingly driven by capital and
industry rather than by agriculture, massive political, social, and economic consequences
followed. For example, as the factory was rapidly replacing the farm as the nucleus of the
American economy, lifestyles reflective of work in the factories located in America’s
urban centers were replacing the traditional culture that had grown up around a rural
agrarian lifestyle. As a result of the great disparities in wealth which resulted from these
changes and the real and perceived inequalities that followed, massive social movements
emerged to challenge these inequities.
Generally, these social movements fall under what has been termed reformism or
progressivism. Though not monolithic, the progressive movement took on the great
power of the emerging corporations and institutions of capitalism which were the
apparent forces of subjugation. Furthermore, as the progressive movement gained
traction, it began to build political influence in both the state and Federal governments as
well, leading to the emergence of reform legislation. These developments, in turn, led to
conflict between progressive reformers and the institutions which were the target of their
reforms. Accordingly, the Supreme Court became one of the central forums for this
debate between the industrialists, who fought to protect their economic rights, and the
progressives, who fought for better wages and working conditions.

11

The Court responded to the rising progressive tide with inconsistency, upholding
progressive legislation in some cases while declaring it unconstitutional in other cases.
Thus, the great lack of consensus among scholars of the jurisprudence of the turn-of-thecentury-Court should come as no surprise. Some have interpreted the turn-of-the-century
Court as defenders of an illegitimate doctrine guided by a discredited and repugnant
social theory. Others, however, have interpreted the Court’s behavior as consistent with
traditional notions of American liberty and thus construed the justices not as advocates of
brutal individualism following from social Darwinism but as ardent defenders of liberty.
However, though there seems to be a great deal of confusion over the behavior of the
turn-of-the-century Court, I believe that these apparently disparate interpretations can be
reconciled in light of recent scholarship on social Darwinism.

Maximum Hours, Minimum Wages Legislation, and Limitations on the Liberty of
Contract: Lochner, Muller, Adkins, and West Coast Hotel

Though there are a number of cases in which the Court was forced to confront
progressive-era reform legislation, the maximum-hours and minimum-wage cases are
perhaps some of the most significant to scholars who have either eschewed or advocated
the view that the turn-of-the-century Court was influenced by social Darwinism. In fact,
Lochner, the case from which the era derives its name, falls within this area of public
policy. Thus, since Lochner is at the center of such controversy, this case is perhaps the
rational place from which to begin a discussion of the Court’s turn-of-the-century
minimum wage and maximum hours jurisprudence.
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Lochner v. New York and its Antecedents

By the time the case of Lochner v. New York reached the Supreme Court, the
notion of “liberty of contract” had been clearly articulated in a few nineteenth-century
cases. The Court had initially rejected this notion when it first emerged in The
Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873) and in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
However, having gained acceptance in the majority opinion of Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165
U.S. 578 (1897), the liberty of contract doctrine thus became enshrined in the Court’s
jurisprudence.
Soon after the Civil War, the Court was confronted with cases in which a
substantive notion of due process was used to argue that states were limited in their
authority to pass laws that may impinge on the economic liberties of individuals or
groups. However, the majority of the Court in these cases rejected this notion as
untenable. Indeed, in the Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873), the Court held that
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not prevent the State of
Louisiana from passing a law which, in effect, created a state-sanctioned monopoly of
slaughterhouses. However, the dissenters—Justices Field and Bradley—argued that the
state had passed an arbitrary law which impinged upon the plaintiffs’ economic liberties
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. On this point, Justice Bradley wrote that

A law which prohibits a large class of citizens from adopting a
lawful employment, or from following a lawful employment
previously adopted, does deprive them of liberty as well as
property, without due process of the law. Their right of choice is a
portion of their liberty; their occupation is their property (83 U.S.
at 122).
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While the majority in The Slaughterhouse Cases dismissed the interpretation of the due
process clause, the Court hinted elsewhere at the possibility that the states might face
some limitations with regard to their regulatory sphere. For example, in Munn v. Illinois,
94 U.S. 113 (1876), the Court reasoned that the business of grain storage was a business
affected with a “public interest” and thus subject to control “by the public for the
common good”—a notion which the Court viewed as being derivable from the “common
law” and being further “protected” by the Constitution (94 U.S. at 132, 126). Thus, the
Court upheld the constitutionality of an Illinois state law which regulated grain storage
pricing on the basis that the legislature of Illinois had properly exercised its authority in
controlling the price of grain storage because it is a business which is naturally public,
rather than private, and thus subject to public scrutiny.
Justice Field, of course, disagreed with the majority opinion in Munn. In his
dissent, he wrote that, by declaring the Illinois law constitutional, the majority’s opinion
was, in fact, “subversive of the rights of private property… protected by constitutional
guarantees against legislative interference, and… in conflict with the authorities cited in
its support” (94 U.S. at 136). Furthermore, Justice Field argued, the rationale of the
majority led to the necessary conclusion that “all property and all business in the State are
held at the mercy of a majority of its legislature”—a view which Field clearly rejected
(94 U.S. at 140). Thus, underpinning Field’s opinion and mirroring Bradley’s dissent in
The Slaughterhouse Cases is the notion that the term ‘liberty’ in the due process clause
has substantive meaning. For Justice Field, the term ‘liberty’ referred, among other
things, to an individual’s “freedom…to pursue such callings and avocations as may be
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most suitable to develop his capacities, and give to them their highest enjoyment” (94
U.S. at 142). Moreover, Justice Field wrote,

The same liberal construction which is required for the protection
of life and liberty, in all particulars in which life and liberty are of
any value, should be applied to the protection of private property
(94 U.S. at 142).

Therefore, though the Court’s opinion in Munn remained largely consistent with its
opinion in the Slaughterhouse Cases, the Court modified its position by adding an
additional category of economic activities in which the state may interfere (i.e., those
affected with a pubic interest). However, Justice Field’s dissent in Munn had left the
status of the protection of private economic activities open to interpretation.
For many years subsequent to Munn, the Court continued to reject the notion that
the due process clause protected economic liberties from arbitrary state laws. However,
this view had begun to change significantly by the 1890s. For instance, in Allgeyer v.
State of Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897), the Court overturned a Louisiana State law
which prohibited its citizens from purchasing insurance from companies which were not
state-licensed. In order to challenge the constitutionality of this law, E. Allgeyer
Company had “deliberately” violated it (Irons 1999, pg. 248), and its lawyers had chosen
similar arguments—which were based on the notion that the due process clause protected
economic liberties vis-à-vis a “liberty of contract”— to those raised by the unsuccessful
petitioners in The Slaughterhouse Cases (Ivers 2002, pg. 475). However, departing from
its reasoning in The Slaughterhouse Cases, the Court in Allgeyer unanimously held that
the Louisiana state law had, indeed, arbitrarily impinged upon the company’s “liberty of
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contract” in violation of the Constitution (Irons 1999, pg. 248). 3 Furthermore, Allgeyer
contains not only a unanimous adoption of a liberty of contract doctrine, representing a
significant departure from earlier cases, but also a more detailed explication of the
meaning and scope of this doctrine along with a more comprehensive presentation of its
sources. With respect to the scope and meaning of liberty of contract as embodied in the
Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Peckham wrote for the majority that

[t]he liberty mentioned in that amendment means, not only the
right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his
person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the
right of the citizen to be free in the employment of all his faculties;
to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he
will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any
livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all
contacts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to his
carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above
mentioned (165 U.S. at 589).

Furthermore, with respect to the sources of this view of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Justice Peckham quoted Justice Bradley’s concurring opinion from Butchers' Union
Company v. Crescent City Company, 111 U.S. 746 (1884):

The right to follow any of the common occupations of life is an
inalienable right. It was formulated as such under the phrase
'pursuit of happiness' in the Declaration of Independence, which
commenced with the fundamental proposition that 'all men are
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit
of happiness.' This right is a large ingredient in the civil liberty of
the citizen…I hold that the liberty of pursuit -- the right to follow
any of the ordinary callings of life -- is one of the privileges of a
3

Allgeyer v. State of Louisiana (1897) was decided unanimously. Thus, it was a significant turnabout from
both the Slaughterhouse Cases and Munn v. Illinois, which were decided 5 to 4 and 7 to 2, respectively.

16

citizen of the United States…[b]ut if it does not abridge the
privileges and immunities of a citizen of the United States to
prohibit him from pursuing his chosen calling, and giving to others
the exclusive right of pursuing it, it certainly does deprive him (to
a certain extent) of his liberty; for it takes from him the freedom of
adopting and following the pursuit which he prefers; which, as
already intimated, is a material part of the liberty of the citizen
(Butchers' Union Company v. Crescent City Company, 111 U.S. at
762 as cited in 165 U.S. at 589).

Likewise, though Peckham conceded that “remarks were made in regard to questions of
monopoly,” he argued that they “well describe the rights which are covered by the word
‘liberty’ as contained in the Fourteenth Amendment” (165 U.S. at 590). Thus, Allgeyer
represents the earliest uses of the liberty of contract doctrine to overturn state legislation.
This doctrine would later be used to overturn a number of minimum wage and maximum
hours statutes.
At the time of Lochner, the application of this liberty of contract doctrine to
maximum hours legislation had just recently been addressed in Holden v. Hardy,169 U.S.
366 (1898). In Holden, the Court had found an inherent dangerousness in underground
mine-work and had therefore held that the setting of maximum hours for underground
mine workers comported with a legitimate means of maintaining the health, welfare, and
safety of the community. Thus, the Court maintained that the Utah statute limiting the
hours of mine workers constituted a legitimate use of state police power and was
therefore constitutional. Nevertheless, though upholding the Utah statute in Holden, there
the Court did not reject the doctrine of liberty of contract.
However, though the Court had ruled in Holden that the states had the power to
set maximum hours constraints if a genuine interest existed in protecting the safety of
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those whom the statute would affect—in that case, mine workers—the Court in Lochner
struck down a similar New York statute which placed limits on the working hours of
bakers. In 1897, the New York State legislature passed a law limiting the hours which
bakers could work. The passage of this statute was perceived as a major victory for both
the progressive movement and the statute’s principal backer, Henry Weismann, then the
secretary of the Journeymen Baker’s Union (Irons 1999). However, the law was viewed
by many to be unconstitutional and was thus soon challenged in the state courts (Irons
1999). In 1899, Joseph Lochner, the owner of a small Utica bakery, was convicted of
violating the State “bakers” statue and forced to pay a fine of twenty-five dollars (Irons
1999). After losing an appeal in the highest state court, Lochner appealed his case to the
United States Supreme Court on “due process” grounds, or, rather, on the grounds that
the statute violated the petitioner’s so-called “liberty of contract” contained in the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (Irons 1999, pg. 255).
In Lochner v. New York, the Court argued that, though the state may impose
constraints on one’s liberty to contract, such limitations must have legitimate ends and
must fall within what the Court defines as the state’s police powers, or its power to
legislate to protect the general health, welfare, safety, and good order of the community.
Since the New York statute was purely a “labor law,” Justice Peckham argued, and
because there was neither a nexus between the protection of the safety of bakers and the
limitations on their hours of work nor a provision in the law allowing employees to work
longer hours in times of “emergency,” the statute illegitimately infringed on liberty of
contract in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (198 U.S. at
57, 55).
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Indeed, with respect to the police powers of the State and the powers of the Court
in this matter, Justice Peckham wrote that,

[i]n every case that comes before this court…where legislation of
this character is concerned and where the protection of the Federal
Constitution is sought, the question necessarily arises: Is this a fair,
reasonable and appropriate exercise of the police power of the
State, or is it an unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary
interference with the right of the individual to his personal liberty
or to enter into those contracts in relation to labor which may seem
to him appropriate or necessary for the support of himself and his
family? Of course the liberty of contract relating to labor includes
both parties to it. The one has as much right to purchase as the
other to sell labor (198 U.S. at 56).

Moreover, he argued, although the Court may be “opposed” to such laws which the
legislature enacts under its police powers, “the question would still remain: Is it within
the police power of the State? and that question must be answered by the court” (198 U.S.
at 57). Thus, with respect to the New York statute, Justice Peckham concluded that

[t]he question whether this act is valid as a labor law, pure and
simple, may be dismissed in a few words. There is no reasonable
ground for interfering with the liberty of person or the right of free
contract, by determining the hours of labor, in the occupation of a
baker (198 U.S. at 57).

In contending that there was no reasonable ground on which the statute stood, Peckham
wrote that “[t]here is no contention that bakers as a class are not equal in intelligence and
capacity to men in other trades or manual occupations, or that they are not able to assert
their rights and care for themselves without the protecting arm of the State, interfering
with their independence of judgment and of action,” and that bakers were “in no sense
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wards of the State” (198 U.S. at 57). Likewise, Peckham found reason to believe neither
that the statute had a legitimate “health” aspect, nor that it had been designed to protect
either the welfare, safety, or morals of the community (198 U.S. at 57). In fact, Peckham
speculated that the statute “does not affect any other portion of the public than those who
are engaged in that occupation” since “[c]lean and wholesome bread does not depend
upon whether the baker works but ten hours per day or only sixty hours a week” (198
U.S. at 57). Nevertheless, Peckham claimed, though statistical evidence suggested that
baking “does not appear to be as healthy as some other trades,” it was “also vastly more
healthy than still others”; to be sure, “[t]o the common understanding the trade of a baker
has never been regarded as an unhealthy one” (198 U.S. at 59). According to Peckham,
“[t]here must be more than the mere fact of the possible existence of some small amount
of unhealthiness to warrant legislative interference with liberty” (198 U.S. at 59). Thus,
he concluded that “[statutes] limiting the hours in which grown and intelligent men may
labor to earn their living are mere meddlesome interferences with the rights of the
individual, and they are not saved from condemnation by the claim that they are passed in
the exercise of the police power” (198 U.S. at 61). Thus, on the bases that the Court is the
legitimate and final arbiter of the limit and scope of state police powers and that the
statute addressed no legitimate safety, health, welfare, or moral concerns, the majority of
the Court ruled that the New York statute limiting the work-hours for bakers was
unconstitutional. However, the decision was not unanimous; four justices disagreed with
both the majority’s rationale and its interpretation of the facts.
With respect to the facts, Justices Harlan, Day, and White challenged the assertion
of the majority that, on balance, baking is a benign activity. To the contrary, these
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dissenting Justices observed that, according to a number of sources, baking was in fact a
dangerous occupation in which there was a nexus between long work-hours and injurious
effects. Thus, the dissent argued that there were indeed legitimate health and safety
concerns which the statute attempted to remedy. Accordingly, these dissenters disagreed
with the majority’s central thesis that the statute was an illegitimate infringement on the
liberty of contract.
Though Justices Harlan, Day and White challenged some of the significant facts
of the case, Justice Holmes challenged the underlying theory on which he believed the
majority rested its case. In his separate dissent, Holmes contended that

[i]f it were a question whether I agreed with that theory I should
desire to study it further and long before making up my mind. But I
do not conceive that to be my duty, because I strongly believe that
my agreement or disagreement has nothing to do with the right of a
majority to embody their opinions in law…[t]he liberty of the
citizen to do as he likes so long as he does not interfere with the
liberty of others to do the same, which has been a shibboleth for
some well-known writers, is interfered with by school laws, by the
Post Office, by every state or municipal institution which takes his
money for purposes thought desirable, whether he likes it or not.
The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's
Social Statics…[and] a constitution is not intended to embody a
particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic
relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire (198 U.S. at
75).

Thus, Holmes claimed that majorities have the right to embody their opinions in law
irrespective of his personal views. Nevertheless, he believed that the Constitution does
not endorse a particular economic theory and argued that an illegitimate economic theory
underpinned the majority’s opinion—“an economic theory which a large part of the
country does not entertain” (198 U.S. at 75). In addition, Holmes’ indictment of the
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Court for attempting to embody Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics vis-à-vis the Fourteenth
Amendment perhaps suggests that, in his view, the Constitution does not endorse a
particular social theory either. Accordingly, Holmes concluded by writing that

the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when it
is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion,
unless it can be said that a rational and fair man necessarily would
admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental
principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our
people and our law (198 U.S. at 75).

Thus, Holmes argued that the majority of the Court based its decision on illegitimate
grounds because it “pervert[ed]” the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment by drawing
from an economic or perhaps social theory which was not reflective of majority opinion
and by presenting an interpretation of liberty which prevents the “natural outcome” of
“dominant opinion” (198 U.S. at 76).

Beyond Lochner: The Demise of Liberty of Contract in Minimum Wage and
Maximum Hours Cases

Though it had reversed a reformist victory by overturning maximum hours
legislation in Lochner, the Court upheld similar legislation only a few years later in
Muller v. State of Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
Muller, like Lochner and Holden, emerged from the continued public debate
surrounding working conditions at the turn of the century. However, unlike those earlier
cases, Muller was a case which dealt solely with the working conditions of women.
Writing for the majority, which included Holmes, Justice Brewer argued that, though the
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plaintiff in error was correct in arguing that the Court had overturned similar legislation
in Lochner, he “assume[d]” that the differences between men and women would not
justify disparate treatment with respect to contractual rights (208 U.S. at 419). However,
Brewer argued, there were indeed substantial differences that required disparate treatment
under the strictures of liberty of contract. Alluding to the collection of statistics, research,
and “other” sources complied and presented by Louis Brandeis, who argued the case on
behalf of the State of Oregon, Brewer argued that there was considerable evidence that
women were in fact different from men, both in their “physical structure” and in the
“functions” they performed, and were thus entitled to “special legislation restricting or
qualifying under which [they] should be permitted to toil” (208 U.S. at 420).
Furthermore, Justice Brewer noted specifically that it is obvious that “woman’s physical
structure and the performance of her maternal functions place her at a disadvantage in the
struggle for subsistence” (208 U.S. at 421). Noting that “this is especially true when the
burdens of motherhood are upon her,” he reasoned that,

Even when they are not, by abundant testimony of the medical
fraternity, continuance for a long time on her feet at work,
repeating this from day to day, tends to injurious effects upon the
body, and, as healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring,
the physical wellbeing of woman becomes an object of the public
interest and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the
race…in the struggle for subsistence she is not an equal competitor
with her brother (208 U.S. at 421).

Thus, Brewer concluded, “she is properly placed in a class by herself, and legislation
designed for her protection may be sustained even when like legislation is not necessary
for men, and could not be sustained” (208 U.S. at 422). Therefore, the Court upheld the
Oregon statue despite the fact that the law differed significantly from the law under
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indictment in Lochner only in that it applied only to women. However, although the
Court in Muller sustained the notion of special protections for women, which allowed the
state’s legitimate infringement on the liberty of contract, it would reject such special
protections a mere thirteen years later with respect to their application to statutes which
allowed for the fixing of minimum wages for women in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital
261 U.S. 525 (1923).
Arguing for the majority, Justice Sutherland wrote that, though Muller had rested
on the notion that considerable differences existed between men and woman, the
Nineteenth Amendment—which gave women the right to vote—and other such
legislation had immensely augmented the “contractual, political and civil status of
women,” thus diminishing inequalities between the sexes almost to the “vanishing point”
(261 U.S. at 553). However, Justice Sutherland argued, though the non-physical
differences between the sexes were moot, the Court may take into account the “physical
differences” between men and women in the “appropriate cases” (261 U.S. at 553).
Nevertheless, he noted that “we [the Court] cannot accept the doctrine that women of
mature age, sui juris, require or may be subjected to restrictions upon their liberty of
contract which could not lawfully be imposed in the case of men under similar
circumstances” (261 U.S. at 553). Thus, irrespective of the doctrine of special treatment
articulated in Muller, the Court overturned the federal statute which allowed for the
establishment of a minimum wage for women in certain kinds of professions.
Although the Court had rejected the constitutionality of minimum wage laws
based on sexual differences in Adkins, in the late 1930’s, the Court suddenly discarded
the constitutional theory upon which it had previously based its rejection of such
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legislation in Adkins and Lochner, respectively. The Court had relied on the liberty of
contract doctrine in rejecting the constitutionality of minimum wage laws for women in
Morehead v. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936). However, despite the fact that there had been
no subsequent change in the composition of the Court, it reversed its decision in
Morehead the following year when it upheld minimum wage laws in West Coast Hotel v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). What is more, in West Coast Hotel, the Court explicitly
rejected the doctrine of liberty of contract as an invalid interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In this case, Chief Justice Hughes wrote that, in Adkins and Morehead:

[T]he violation alleged by those attacking minimum wage
regulation for women is deprivation of freedom of contract. What
is this freedom? The Constitution does not speak of freedom of
contract. It speaks of liberty without due process of law. In
prohibiting that deprivation, the Constitution does not recognize an
absolute and uncontrollable liberty. Liberty in each of its phases
has its history and connotation. But the liberty safeguarded is
liberty in a social organization which requires the protection of law
against the evils which menace the health, safety, morals and
welfare of the people. Liberty under the Constitution is thus
necessarily subject to the restraints of due process, and regulation
which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the
interests of the community is due process. This essential limitation
of liberty in general governs freedom of contract in particular (300
U.S. at 391-92).

Moreover, Hughes suggested that, instead of placing no limitations on the freedom of
contract, the jurisprudence of the Court and the Constitution implied the opposite. For
example, Hughes noted that the Constitution impeded freedom of contract in cases which
involved a “public interest with respect to contracts between employer and employee”
(300 U.S. at 392-93). Indeed, Hughes asserted,
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[i]n dealing with the relation of employer and employed, the
legislature has necessarily a wide field of discretion in order that
there may be suitable protection of health and safety, and that
peace and good order may be promoted through regulations
designed to insure wholesome conditions of work and freedom
from oppression (300 U.S. at 393).

Furthermore, Hughes wrote that he thought that “the decision in the Adkins case was a
departure from the true application of the principles governing the regulation by the State
of the relation of the employer and employed” (300 U.S. at 397). Likewise, citing Nebbia
v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), Hughes wrote that if laws which regulate private
contracts “have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither
arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied” (300 U.S. at
398, citing Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. at 537, 538). Accordingly, again citing Nebbia,
Hughes reiterated that

times without number we have said that the legislature is primarily
the judge of the necessity of such an enactment, that every possible
presumption is in favor of its validity, and that, though the court
may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of the law, it may
not be annulled unless palpably in excess of legislative power (300
U.S. at 379, citing Nebbia v. New York 291 U.S. at 502)

Likewise, with respect to the statute setting a minimum wage for women, Hughes asked,
“[w]hat can be closer to the public interest that the health of women and their protection
from unscrupulous and overreaching employers?” (300 U.S. at 398) Additionally, as a
class, women received the “least pay,” had “relatively weak” “bargaining power” and
were “ready victims of those who would take advantage of their necessitous
circumstances” (300 U.S. at 398). Thus, “[t]he legislature of the State was clearly entitled
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to consider the situation of women in employment” and “to adopt measures to reduce the
evils of the ‘sweating system,’ the exploiting of workers at wages so low as to be
inefficient to meet the bare cost of living,” (300 U.S. at 398. 399). In addition, with
respect to the sweating system and the ways in which the states were dealing with it at the
time, Hughes noted that many states had responded to this problem by taking similar
measures, a fact which perhaps reflected “a deepseated conviction both as to the presence
of the evil and as to the means adapted to check it” (300 U.S. at 399). Thus, on this
matter Hughes concluded that
[l]egislative response to that conviction cannot be regarded as
arbitrary or capricious, and that is all we have to decide. Even if
the wisdom of the policy be regarded as debatable and its effects
uncertain, still the legislature is entitled to its judgment (300 U.S.
at 399).

Additionally, aside from his claim that states have the authority to set minimum wage
laws for women because there may be a legitimate policy concern over the detriments of
the so-called sweating system, Hughes maintained that there were “additional and
compelling” considerations which may have suggested that minimum wage laws
protecting women were all the more legitimate (300 U.S. at 399). Hughes noted that the
“recent economic experience” of the Great Depression had revealed that a credible case
could be made for minimum wage protections based on the notion that “[t]he bare cost of
living must be met” and that “[t]he exploitation of a class of workers who are in an
unequal position with respect to bargaining power and are thus relatively defenceless
against the denial of a living wage… casts a direct burden for their support upon the
community” (300 U.S. at 379). Furthermore, argues Hughes, “[w]hat these workers lose
in wages the taxpayers are called upon to pay”; however, “[t]he community is not bound
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to provide what is in effect a subsidy for unconscionable employers” (300 U.S. at 399).
To be sure, Hughes concluded,

The community may direct its law-making power to correct the
abuse which springs from their selfish disregard of the public
interest. The argument that the legislation in question constitutes
an arbitrary discrimination, because it does not extend to men, is
unavailing. This Court has frequently held that the legislative
authority, acting within its proper field, is not bound to extend its
regulation to all cases which it might possibly reach… This
familiar principle has repeatedly been applied to legislation which
singles out women, and particular classes of women, in the
exercise of the State's protective power…[t]heir relative need in
the presence of the evil, no less than the existence of the evil itself,
is a matter for the legislative judgment (300 U.S. at 400).

Thus, the majority of the Court upheld the Washington State minimum wage statute
protecting women on the basis that, despite Adkins, there was in fact a legitimate policy
consideration in setting a wage which comported with living standards. This decision was
based on the fact that women had traditionally occupied an inferior bargaining position
and, because of this, were left at the mercy of their employers, who were in a position to
exploit this reality by paying women substantially less than other groups. Additionally,
the Great Depression had only exacerbated this tradition of exploitation, thus creating a
significant burden on the community. This burden, in turn, brought about the absurdity in
which the community was forced, in effect, to subsidize unconscionable employers.
Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, the majority of the Court eschewed the
liberty of contract doctrine and gave state legislatures new powers to regulate their
economies by giving the states the authority to set minimum wage laws for women,
effectively overturning Adkins. However, though the majority of the Court in West Coast
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Hotel rejected both the liberty of contract doctrine and the arguments from Adkins, in
which it had been proffered that women did not deserve special treatment because they
had overcome their inferior status, the dissenting Justices vehemently disagreed with both
of these lines of reasoning. Furthermore, the dissenters rejected the notion that the
contemporary economic troubles reflected in the Great Depression gave special weight to
the notion that there is a compelling community interest in guaranteeing a minimum
wage to women.
The dissenting Justices pointed to the earlier decisions in Morehead and Adkins as
the proper standards by which the Washington State statute should have been judged.
Moreover, Justice Sutherland, in his dissent, noted that the Court has a constitutional
responsibility to uphold the provisions of the Constitution and that, despite the changes in
economic conditions between Adkins and West Coast Hotel, the words and the meaning
of the Constitution had not changed. Likewise, he continued, “[t]he judicial function is
that of interpretation; it does not include the power of amendment under the guise of
interpretation” (300 U.S. at 404), Thus, he reasoned,

[i]f the Constitution, intelligently and reasonably construed in the
light of these principles, stands in the way of desirable legislation,
the blame must rest upon that instrument, and not upon the court
for enforcing it according to its terms. The remedy in that situation
-- and the only true remedy -- is to amend the Constitution … [t]he
people by their Constitution created three separate, distinct,
independent and coequal departments of government…each of the
departments is an agent of its creator; and one department is not
and cannot be the agent of another…therefore, of the Executive
and of Congress that an act is constitutional is persuasive in a high
degree; but it is not controlling (300 U.S. at 404).
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Moreover, with respect to the statute in question, Sutherland argued that, irrespective of
the dispute over the possible benefits and the dangers of minimum wage legislation—i.e.,
whether a minimum wage might remedy the problems associated with “underpaid labor,”
or might instead “bring down the earnings of the more efficient employees toward the
level of the less-efficient employees”—the Court should only be concerned with the
“question of constitutionality” of the statute (300 U.S. at 405-406). Accordingly, he
argued that the Fourteenth Amendment forbade legislation such as that which was before
the Court in West Coast Hotel and that Morehead and Adkins had thus been rightly
decided. Indeed, Sutherland contended that
[the fact that] the clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which
forbids a state to deprive any person of life, liberty or property
without due process of law includes freedom of contract is so well
settled as to be no longer open to question. Nor reasonably can it
be disputed that contracts of employment of labor are included in
the rule (300 U.S. at 406).

Invoking cases such as Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908), Coppage v. Kansas,
236 U.S. 1 (1915), and Adkins, Justice Sutherland argued that, though the Court had
maintained that there was no “absolute freedom of contract,” it was the “general rule and
restraint [was] the exception [and] the power to abridge that freedom could only be
justified by the existence of exceptional circumstances” (300 U.S. at 406). Quoting
Justice Harlan from the majority opinion in Adair, Justice Sutherland wrote of freedom of
contract:
The right of a person to sell his labor upon such terms as he deems
proper is, in its essence, the same as the right of the purchaser of
labor to prescribe the conditions upon which he will accept such
labor from the person offering to sell. . . . In all such particulars the
employer and employe have equality of right, and any legislation
that disturbs that equality is an arbitrary interference with the
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liberty of contract which no government can legally justify in a
free land (300 U.S. at 406, citing Adair v. United States 208 U.S.
at 174-175).

Additionally, Justice Sutherland noted, in cases in which the Court had addressed
minimum wage legislation, it had found in none of these cases anything that would have
constituted a legitimate infringement on the freedom of contract. Indeed, with respect to
these cases and to the case before the Court, Justice Sutherland contended that

[this case] does not deal with any business charged with a public
interest, or with public work, or with a temporary emergency, or
with the character, methods or periods of wage payments, or with
hours of labor, or with the protection of persons under legal
disability, or with the prevention of fraud. It is, simply and
exclusively, a law fixing wages for adult women who are legally as
capable of contracting for themselves as men, and cannot be
sustained unless upon principles apart from those involved in cases
already decided by the court (300 U.S. at 407).

Thus, Sutherland contended that the Washington State minimum wage legislation was
“essentially arbitrary” (300 U.S. at 408). In Sutherland’s view, the arbitrary nature of the
statute was further demonstrated by the lack of “relation [of wages] to the capacity or
earning power of the employee, to the number of hours which constitute the day's work,
the character of the place where the work is to be done, or the circumstances or
surroundings of the employment” (300 U.S. at 408). These issues were problematic
because too much weight was being given to the needs of one class of employees at a
potentially great expense to employers. In fact, argued Sutherland:

The law takes account of the necessities of only one party to the
contract. It ignores the necessities of the employer by compelling
him to pay not less than a certain sum, not only whether the
employee is capable of earning it, but irrespective of the ability of
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his business to sustain the burden, generously leaving him, of
course, the privilege of abandoning his business as an alternative
for going on at a loss…. It takes no account of periods of stress and
business depression, of crippling losses, which may leave the
employer himself without adequate means of livelihood. To the
extent that the sum fixed exceeds the fair value of the services
rendered, it amounts to a compulsory exaction from the employer
for the support of a partially indigent person, for whose condition
there rests upon him no peculiar responsibility, and therefore, in
effect, arbitrarily shifts to his shoulders a burden which, if it
belongs to anybody, belongs to society as a whole (300 U.S. at
409).

Furthermore, not only did this type of legislation create a potential inequality for
employers, Sutherland echoed the majority opinion in Adkins by arguing that “[w]omen
today stand upon a legal and political equality with men,” so that “[t]here is no longer
any reason why they should be put in different classes in respect of their legal right to
make contracts” (300 U.S. at 411, 412). Accordingly, women should not be “denied, in
effect, the right to compete with men for work paying lower wages which men may be
willing to accept…[a]nd it is an arbitrary exercise of the legislative power to do so” (300
U.S. at 412). Moreover, Sutherland argued that, indeed, “[d]ifference of sex affords no
reasonable ground for making a restriction applicable to the wage contracts of all
working women from which like contracts of all working men are left free…[t]he ability
to make a fair bargain, as everyone knows, does not depend upon sex” (300 U.S. at 413).
Likewise, Sutherland concluded:

It is hard to see why the power to fix minimum wages does not
connote a like power in respect of maximum wages. And yet, if
both powers be exercised in such a way that the minimum and the
maximum so nearly approach each other as to become
substantially the same, the right to make any contract in respect of
wages will have been completely abrogated (300 U.S. at 413-414).
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Thus, Sutherland disputed the central theses of the majority’s claims and argued that the
Washington statute was an unconstitutional violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Additionally, while the majority of the Court clearly rejected the doctrine of liberty of
contract in West Coast Hotel, the Court would have to confront this doctrine in many
subsequent cases, such as Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483 (1955)
or Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). However, the Court continued to reject this
doctrine throughout the 1940s, 50s, and 60s.

Social Darwinism and Social Darwinism in American Thought: Hofstadter and
Bannister

The development and demise of the liberty of contract doctrine can clearly be
seen in the Court’s minimum wage and maximum hours jurisprudence from the turn of
the century. However, what is unclear is the influence of social Darwinism upon these
developments. Thus, a more thorough discussion of the three principal views of social
Darwinism is required in order to investigate this matter further. I will adopt Hawkins’
view as the principal framework within which I will assess the influence of social
Darwinism on the turn-of-the-century Court. However, I will draw from Bannister’s view
as well to provide contrast to Hawkins’ view. Despite their different contentions about
social Darwinism, I believe that, given the Court’s rhetoric, both views suggest that social
Darwinism was not significantly influential to the Court’s development and use of the
liberty of contract doctrine in its minimum wage and maximum hours jurisprudence.
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Hofstadter and Social Darwinism

Mid-twentieth-century historians, such as Richard Hofstadter, argue that
Darwinism had a profound impact on American thought in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries (1944). For Hofstadter, though Darwinism impacted a number of
disciplines, one of its most profound effects was its influence on American social
thought, which was becoming deeply conservative at the time (1944, pg. 5). Indeed,
Hofstadter explains that, though Darwin’s evolutionary theory was akin to a
“Copernican” revolution in the biological sciences and had thus impacted its
practitioners, practitioners of the social sciences were influenced by this new theory as
well (Hofstadter 1944, pg 4). On this point, Hofstadter writes:

Darwinism established a new approach to nature and gave fresh
impetus to the conception of development; it impelled men to try
to exploit its findings and methods for the understanding of society
through schemes of evolutionary development and organic
analogies… Almost everywhere in western civilization, though in
varying degrees according to intellectual traditions and personal
temperaments, thinkers of the Darwinian era seized upon the new
theory and attempted to sound its meaning for the several social
disciplines. Anthropologists, sociologists, historians, political
theorists, economists were set to pondering what, if anything,
Darwinian concepts meant for their own disciplines (1944, pg. 4).

In addition, Hofstadter argues that, though Herbert Spencer was one of the very early
thinkers to articulate the social implications of evolution, Spencer’s theory was not
grounded in Darwin’s conceptualization of evolution (1944).
Moreover, though Darwin and Spencer were influential in their native England,
both of these thinkers’ ideas were greeted in the United States by a public that showed
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great interest in adopting the concepts of these theories into their own conceptual lexicon
(Hofstadter 1944). Parallel both to the emergence of Darwin’s and Spencer’s ideas and to
the acceptance of these ideas into American intellectual thought, the United States was
undergoing immense political, economic, and social changes. These changes, according
to Hofstadter, led America into a “mood” which was predominantly “conservative”
(1944, pg. 5). Though there were “challenges” to this conservatism, the dominant
“feeling” of the late nineteenth century was that it was a time for political, social and
economic “acquiescence” rather than a time for “reform” (Hofstadter 1944, pg 5). Thus,
Hofstadter argues,
Darwinism was seized upon as a welcome addition…to the store of
ideas to which solid and conservative men appealed when they
wished to reconcile their fellows to some of the hardships of life
and to prevail upon them not to support hasty and ill-considered
reforms…Darwinism was one of the great informing insights in
this long phase in the history of the conservative mind in America.
It was those who wished to defend the political status quo, above
all the laissez-faire conservatives, who were first to pick up the
instruments of the social argument that were forged out of the
Darwinian concepts (1944, pgs 5-6).
Furthermore, Hofstadter contends, the impact of Darwinism on the predominant latenineteenth-century American conservative “outlook” was twofold (144, pg. 6). One,
Hofstadter claims, the catchphrases “survival of the fittest” and the “struggle for
existence,” which were “popular” notions found in Darwin’s writings, provided a
“natural law” foundation to the notions that the lives of individuals in society were
guided by natural forces which allowed the “best competitors” to survive in “competitive
situations” and that this process would lead, in turn, to “continuing improvement” (1944,
pg. 6). In addition to the impact of these “catchwords” on conservative thought,
Hofstadter argues, Darwin’s notion that continual development and improvement took
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eons bolstered the notion in “conservative political theory” that “sound development
must be slow and unhurried” (Hofstadter 1944, pgs. 6-7). Thus, for the conservatives,
“society could be envisaged as an organism…which could change only at a glacial pace
at which new species are produced in nature” and that “all attempts to reform social
processes were efforts to remedy the irremediable… [because] they interfered with the
wisdom of nature” (Hofstadter 1944, pg. 7). In the view of the Darwin-informed
conservative, reform could only lead to “degeneration” of society (Hofstadter 1944, pg.
7).
For Hofstadter, the history of social Darwinism deserves examination because it
represents a significant transformation in conservative thought which rests on two
principal notions. First, Hofstadter claims that the American conservatism, which was
driven by social Darwinism, was unique from its earlier forms both because it was
“secular” rather than “religious” in nature and because its “chief conclusion” was that the
“positive functions of the state should be kept to the barest minimum, and it was devoid
of that center of reverence and authority which the state provides in many conservative
systems” (Hofstadter 1944, pg. 7). Second, social Darwinism constituted a conservatism
that attempted to “dispense with sentimental or emotional ties” (Hofstadter 1944, pg. 7).

Revisionist Views of Social Darwinism: Bannister

Though Hofstadter’s study of social Darwinism in American thought had a
profound impact on the understanding of this notion, later historians were less certain
about Hofstadter’s claims. In fact, revisionist historians such as Robert Bannister argue
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that the orthodox historiography of social Darwinism—such as that presented by
Hofstadter—appear not to reflect the reality of turn-of-the-century America (1979).
Although Hofstadter and others had a profound impact on the historiography of
American social Darwinism for several decades, by the 1960s, as Bannister observes,
others began to challenge their historical narrative of its impact (1979). For example,
Bannister argues that, contrary to Hofstadter’s view, Darwinism did not fuel a
conservative movement that was grounded in this secular theory. This thesis was, in fact,
part of a grand mythology of Darwinism’s effect on social thought (i.e., social
Darwinism) (Bannister 1979). According to Bannister, progressive historians such as
Hofstadter overstate the case for the predominantly conservative mood in America in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (1979). Furthermore, Bannister argues,
rather than supporting a conservative movement, Darwinism bolstered the reform ideas
which were taking shape in the late nineteenth century (1979). According to Bannister,
the consensus which developed around the implications of Darwinism was grounded in
its reform characteristics, while the conservative implications of social Darwinism were
so exceptional to the rule that one might conclude that the version of social Darwinism
which Hofstadter and others envisioned was a myth more than a reality (1979). For
Bannister, the conventional “story” of social Darwinism—which Hofstadter has played a
significant role in constructing—is a story which claims that

[i]n the post-Civil War decades…misapplied Darwinism bolstered
laissez-faire, individualism, and Horatio Algerism. For defenders
of the industrial order such phrases as the struggle for existence,
natural selection, and survival of the fittest provided explanation
and excuse for poverty and exploitation. By the 1890s imperialists,
racists, and militarists, also appropriated Darwinism…[a]t the
same time, progressive reformers turned the new biology to their
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own advantage in calling for industrial regulation and social
welfare. In this reform Darwinism…the new catch words were
adaptation, mutual aid, and the struggle for the life of others
(1979, pgs. 3-4).
Although this seems to be the dominant account of the origins and impact of social
Darwinism, Bannister claims that “[a]greement on the use of the term… was not always
so clear” (1979, pg. 4). In fact, social Darwinism has been defined in a number of
different ways by a number of different scholars at both proximate and dissimilar points
in American and European history (Bannister 1979). Bannister observes that social
Darwinism “described a variety of evils” from its first appearance in Europe around 1880
to the time it found its way into American thought twenty years later (1979, pg. 4). For
example, while some early commentators identified social Darwinism as “brutal
individualism” similar to that “advocated” by Herbert Spencer, others insisted that it
provided a “new rationale for socialism and the class struggle”—and even for
“eugenics”—or an explanation for the “rising tide” of imperialism and militarism in the
late nineteenth century (Bannister 1979, pg. 4). By the 1940s, American historians such
as Merle Curti further “expanded” the definition of social Darwinism, using it to refer to
any theory which applied the notions of the struggle for existence or survival of the fittest
to society in general. As Hofstadter had defined it, social Darwinism was not confined to
the “technical provinces of philosophy” but instead referred to “the more general
adaptation of Darwinian, and related concepts, to social ideologies.” However, even in its
expanded form, some historians displayed dissatisfaction with Hofstadter’s definition,
viewing it as incomplete, unclear, or generally lacking “conceptual discrimination”
(Bannister 1979, pg. 5). Bannister notes that one of Hofstadter’s most significant errors
was his failure to make a clear distinction between Darwinism and Spencerianism (1979,
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pg. 5). To some of Hofstadter’s critics, this lack of distinction was significant because it
created difficulty in differentiating between mere practitioners of social science and those
who were truly social Darwinists (Bannister 1979, pg. 5).
Though perhaps lacking a clear conceptual picture of social Darwinism,
Hofstadter and others had a profound impact on defining the conventional historiography
of social Darwinism in American thought. However, Bannister observes, by the 1960s
and ‘70s, historians began seriously to question the conventional view of social
Darwinism. As these historians began to reevaluate American conservative thought of the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the list of those from this era who were
singled out as social Darwinists began to dwindle (Bannister 1979, pgs. 6-7). Some of
these revisionists, such as Irvin G. Wylie, began to argue that, among businessmen,
American conservative thought was influenced by the “rags-to-riches mythology with
deep roots in Christianity and Enlightenment thought” rather than by Darwinism
(Bannister 1979, pg. 6). Other revisionists had also begun to show serious doubt over the
influence of Darwinism on conservative thought, bringing about a deconstruction of the
paradigm created by Hofstadter and other progressive historians. This, in turn, led to a
serious revision of the list of individuals indicted for social Darwinism in the
conventional thesis which Hofstadter had helped to create (Bannister 1979, pg 7-8).
Finally, Bannister argues that, for some, much of this transformation of the conventional
view was guided by a “narrow[ing]” of the definition of social Darwinism based on a
distinction drawn between “religious” or “biological” evolutionism on the one hand and
the role of “brute force” and “cunning” within the notions of “struggle” and “survival” on
the other (1979, pg. 7). Thus, Bannister implicitly or directly challenges Hofstadter’s
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claims that Darwinism had served as a significant underlying source for a
transformation—if there was a transformation at all—in conservative thought in the
nineteenth century and that Darwinism was indistinguishable from the “social
organicism” of Spencer (1979, pg 5).

Hawkins and Social Darwinism: Reconciling Orthodoxy and Revisionism; or,
Towards a New Understanding of the Term

Just as revisionist scholarship on social Darwinism has profound implications for
both revisionist and orthodox views of the turn-of-the-century Court, criticism of these
views carries deep implications as well. Recent scholarship on social Darwinism,
presented by Mike Hawkins, suggests that perhaps both the orthodox (progressive) and
the revisionist interpretations of the Court employ very narrow and misguided
characterizations of social Darwinism.
For Hawkins, the history of social Darwinism is punctuated by a number of
controversies (1997, pgs. 3-19). The controversies identified by Hawkins typically
revolve around four principal issues: the definition, ideological functions, significance
and origins of social Darwinism (1997, pgs. 3-19).
Mike Hawkins argues that some historians, such as both Hofstadter and Bannister,
adopt what he refers to as the “catchphrase approach,” in which social Darwinism is
reduced to a few key phrases such as “survival of the fittest” (Hawkins 1997, pg. 4). For
Hawkins, this approach is problematic because it fails to capture the most crucial
elements of social Darwinism—the underlying assumptions from which social
Darwinism is constructed. In addition, the insufficiency of this approach is demonstrated
by the great deal of contention among scholars of social Darwinism with regard to
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whether social Darwinism was either a predominant view or a conservative philosophy
(Hawkins 1997). For Hawkins, the specific ideologies that may be bolstered by social
Darwinism are of little importance for those who wish to identify proponents of this
view. Instead, one should focus on identifying elements of the underlying assumptions of
social Darwinism in a particular scholar’s work (1997). Specifically, one should pay
close attention to the presence of notions consistent with what Hawkins refers to as
“scientific determinism,” the idea that “biological laws [govern] the whole of organic
nature” in both the social and psychological sphere (1997, pg. 30- 31). Therefore,
Hawkins’ conception of social Darwinism explains why historians such as Bannister and
Hofstadter appear to have very different interpretations of social Darwinism in American
thought. In addition, Hawkins’ view reconciles these two opposing views of social
Darwinism by demonstrating that the underlying assumptions of social Darwinism allow
for a versatility which may be applied to both reform and conservative ideologies.

Defining Social Darwinism – A New Approach: Worldviews, Ideologies, and Social
Theories

For Hawkins, the issue of the definition of social Darwinism has led to a quandary
resulting in significant impediments to scholars’ ability to distinguish with accuracy
between social Darwinists and those who are not social Darwinists (1997, pg. 3). For
Hawkins, although this difficulty has a number of sources, much of it stems from the
approaches themselves (1997). To illustrate, Hawkins notes that many of the scholars of
social Darwinism rely on ill-defined conceptualizations of social Darwinism. In fact, one
popular approach, which Hawkins refers to as the “catchphrase approach,” presupposes
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that social Darwinism can be defined as comprising a list of loosely related or unrelated
concepts (1997, pgs 3-19).
Hawkins argues that the reliance on these “catchphrases” has led scholars to make
significant mistakes in their identification of social Darwinists. For example, though it is
argued that English social Darwinists subscribed to a notion of evolution which was
synonymous with “the growth of rationality, “other English thinkers of the late nineteenth
century, who were “considered by themselves and their contemporaries to be Darwinists,
placed their emphasis elsewhere” (Hawkins 1997, pg. 5). Moreover, as Hawkins notes,
Benjamin Kidd asserts that evolution might be “religious” rather than “intellectual” in
nature (1997, pg. 5). Thus, though Kidd defined himself as a Darwinist, the catchphrase
approach would seem to omit him as an English social Darwinist because his notion of
evolution fails to comport with the notion of evolution as the growth of rationality.
Therefore, Hawkins concludes,

what is required for an understanding of social Darwinism is not
simply an enumeration of its various components but an indication
of how these components relate to one another, and of the
importance of each to the overall configuration (1997, pg. 5)

Furthermore, Hawkins argues that “any attempt to define Darwinism by means of a list of
concepts—even if there is complete agreement on what is to be included in this list—
encounters difficulty in classifying theorists who only subscribe to some of its features”
(1997, pg 4). Thus, Hawkins contends that this “catchphrase approach” is an insufficient
method for identifying social Darwinists because it forces one to evaluate a given work
by comparing it to one or more concepts or catchphrases associated with social
Darwinism rather than through the underlying themes from which the catchphrase
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approach derives its conceptual substance. Thus, the catchphrase approach misses the real
matter, which consists of the interconnected assumptions that underpin the catchphrases
themselves. For Hawkins, the true substance which underpins the catchphrase approach is
the worldview from which these catchphrases are derived, rather than the catchphrases
themselves (1997).
In addition, Hawkins observes that, because of the many controversies
surrounding social Darwinism, some have suggested that the term ‘social Darwinism’
should be “avoided… altogether” and that the social implications of Darwinism should
thus be ignored (1997, pg 16). However, Hawkins argues that the term is too pervasive in
European and American culture to be ignored, observing that the term ‘social Darwinism’
simply “refuses to go away” (Hawkins 1997, pg 16).

The Ideological Functions of Social Darwinism and Social Darwinism as a
Worldview

Hawkins argues that there are two principal “positions” in the “secondary
literature” on the “discursive functions” of social Darwinism (1997, pg. 7). While one
position “links [social Darwinism] to specific ideologies such as laissez-faire liberalism,
racism or imperialism,” the other position regards it as “multivalent [and] capable of
adaptation to a wide range of ideological stances” (Hawkins 1997, pg. 8). Moreover,
Hawkins argues, although these positions on its ideological functions are helpful for
understanding social Darwinism, they are inadequate for allowing one better to define its
“ideological roles” and “discursive boundaries” (1997, pg. 8). Furthermore, in order
better to define both the ideological functions and the discursive boundaries of social
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Darwinism, a better definition of the term is required. For Hawkins, a better definition is
one in which a clear separation of both the “content” and “functions” of social Darwinism
must be undertaken (Hawkins 1997, pg 8). Accordingly, the central framework of
Hawkins’ method for identifying social Darwinists is located in what he refers to as a
“critical” distinction between his notions of “world view” and “ideology” (1997, pg. 21).
For Hawkins, social Darwinism is not a distinct ideology; rather, it is a
worldview based on a number of interdependent concepts which are, in turn, founded on
a number of assumptions about the “the order of nature and of the place of humanity with
in it, and how this order relates to and is affected by the passage of time” (1997, pg. 21).
Hawkins adds that “[a world view] also usually contains a view of social reality and
where this fits into the overall configuration of nature, human nature and time” (1997, pg.
21). Hawkins writes that,
[…] as a world view, Darwinism is a powerful rhetorical
instrument. Its persuasive and flexible rhetorical resources derive
from the existence of indeterminacies within the world view itself,
i.e. open- endedness and even ambiguity over the precise meaning
either of certain key terms or over how they are to be related to
other terms…[and] social Darwinism contains a series of
indeterminacies which provide a rich source for different rhetorical
uses and interpretations…social Darwinism, as a world view, was
deployed as a background to different ideological positions (1997,
pgs 17-18).
Thus, as worldviews, both Darwinism and social Darwinism are both highly versatile.
The other component to any social theory, as Hawkins indicates, is the ideological
component which “comprises a theory of human interactions and how these are mediated
by institutions” (1997, pg. 21). Hawkins argues that the ideological component will have
a “descriptive element that purports to explain some of the features of social and
psychological existence; a critique of certain aspects of this existence, and probably of
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other theories as well; and a prescription for how the socio-political system ought to be
organized” (1997, pg. 21). Therefore, “[t]he ideological aspect of a theory thus contains
both descriptive and evaluative features which often makes difficult the separation of the
empirical and normative claims that are being made” (Hawkins 1997, pg. 21).
According to Hawkins, this distinction between worldview and ideology is an
important one for two reasons. First, “it enables the discursive nature and functions of
social Darwinism to be grasped”; and, second, “it provides the basis for an understanding
of the intellectual context in which social Darwinism appeared” (1997, pgs. 23-24). In
addition, Hawkins argues that social Darwinism “represented” both a “contribution” and
a “response” to the “difficulties” regarding the changes in the thinking with respect to the
“traditionally” perceived role of both human nature and “nature in general” which
occurred in the late nineteenth century (1997, pg 24).

The Social Darwinist Worldview

Hawkins argues that “Darwin’s theory of natural selection—the theory that forms
the nub of the modern theory of evolution—was embedded within and formed part of a
wider world view” (1997, pg. 30). According to Hawkins, “this world view was a
configuration of assumptions concerning nature, time and human nature which gave
natural selection its relevance and meaning” (1997, pgs. 30-31). In addition, he contends
that this worldview is characterized by four principal “elements”:

[the notions that] (i) biological laws governed the whole of organic
nature, including humans; (ii) the pressure of population growth on
resources generated a struggle for existence among organisms; (iii)
physical and mental traits conferring an advantage on their
possessors in this struggle (or in sexual competition), could,
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through inheritance, spread through the population; (iv) the
cumulative effects of selection and inheritance over time accounted
for the emergence of new species and the elimination of others
(1997, pgs. 30-31).

Though Hawkins characterizes Darwinism as consisting of four main assumptions, he
contends that social Darwinism merely extends the first principal assumption of social
Darwinism, that of “scientific determinism,” to “social existence and to those
psychological attributes that play a fundamental role in social life, e.g. reason, religion,
and morality” (1997, pg. 31). Thus, for Hawkins,

it is possible to endorse elements (i)-(iv) without adhering to the
fifth, either on grounds that such features are unique to mankind,
which stands apart from the rest of nature as a divine creation; or,
as was increasingly argued by social scientists, because humans are
cultural creatures and culture cannot be reduced to biological
principles. Social Darwinists, however, are of the view that many
(if not all) aspects of culture—religion, ethics, political institutions,
and the rise and fall of empires and civilizations in addition to
many psychological and behavioral features—can be explained by
the application of the first four elements to these domains. Social
Darwinists, then, endorse two fundamental facts about human
nature: that it is continuous with animal psychology, and that it has
evolved through natural selection (1997, pg. 31).
Therefore, as a worldview rather than an ideology, social Darwinism is highly flexible
and adaptable to multiple ideological positions. This flexibility is a distinct function of
the “indeterminacies surrounding some of its [social Darwinism’s] elements” (Hawkins
1997, pg.32). Moreover, Hawkins notes that one of the most important indeterminacies
is the relationship between the fifth element and the “remainder of the world view”—
which is “especially pronounced for those whose interest was in social evolution” (1997,
pg. 34). Likewise, Hawkins argues that social theorists were then left with “two broad
strategies”: they could either be “reductionist” by arguing that “social evolution was
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dependent on the biological properties of humans,” or “they could argue that social
evolution, while not reducible to biology, nonetheless took place through analogous
processes of adaptation, selection and inheritance (1997, pg. 34). However, with respect
to both theories, Hawkins observes that “[t]here was always a need to show that the social
order in some way mirrored the natural order” (1997, pg. 34). Thus, Hawkins observes
that

[t]his created a potential for the production of a whole range of
equivalencies, analogies, images, metaphors: that societies are
equivalent to biological organisms or that races represent
biological species; individuals are equivalent to cells; that war is a
manifestation of the struggle for existence; that women and
children occupy the same position as ‘savages’ in the scale of
evolution, and so on. Metaphors and images were thus central to
any social Darwinist enterprise, whatever its scientific pretensions,
necessitated by the need to link the first four elements of the world
view with the fifth and to show how human nature was governed
by inexorable law of nature (1997, pg. 34-35).

Nevertheless, though these indeterminacies give social Darwinism its particular
flexibility, this does not mean that this worldview is “so abstract as to indistinguishable
from others, or so bland that it could go with anything” (Hawkins 1997, pg. 35). On the
contrary, argues Hawkins,

[the social Darwinist worldview] embraces scientific materialism,
the rejection of supernatural forces in natural explanation, and a
view of humans as having evolved from non-human life-forms and
as susceptible to change over time (1997, pg. 35).

Accordingly, these “indeterminacies” allow for “adaptability” rather than “ideological
licence”; moreover, “[d]espite its flexibility and the depth of its rhetorical resources, there
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were boundaries to both” (Hawkins 1997, pg. 35). According to Hawkins, “these
boundaries cannot be arbitrarily specified but must be discovered by an examination of
its actual discursive uses” (1997, pg. 35). Indeed, one’s position on any number of issues
cannot simply be “deduce[d]” from the knowledge that one holds the social Darwinist
worldview because the “indeterminacies” within this worldview “allow for the taking up
of quite antithetical positions” (Hawkins 1997, pg. 35).

Hawkins and Social Darwinism in American Thought

As for social Darwinism’s appearance in late-nineteenth and early-twentieth
century American thought, Hawkins points to John Fiske, William Graham Sumner and
William James as influential examples (1997). Further illustrating the adaptability of this
worldview, Hawkins notes that although all of these scholars were influenced by the
writings of either Darwin or Spencer, they interpreted the implications of Darwinism or
Spencerianism in different ways and adapted their interpretations for different purposes
(1997). For example, Fiske interprets Darwin’s notions of evolution to mean that
“warfare” would become obsolete as societies evolved (Hawkins 1997, pg. 107). Sumner,
on the other hand, argued that war was the natural outcome of evolutionary forces which
placed man in the “struggle for existence” (Hawkins 1997, pg. 110). However, though
Sumner and Fiske disagreed on the evolutionary implications for societal interaction with
respect to issues of war and peace, both were mistrustful of “social engineering,” a
quality which both men shared with Herbert Spencer (Hawkins 1997, pg. 109).
In fact, according to Hawkins, Sumner was an outspoken advocate of limited
government interference in society, maintaining that government should play no role in
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legislating for the public welfare (1997). In fact, Hawkins contends that Sumner argued
against state-mandated public welfare policies on the basis that these policies ignored the
“order” of “nature” (1997, pg. 111). For Sumner, interference with this order meant
serious consequences: in the ‘struggle for existence,’ social “reform” only led to the
‘survival of the unfittest,’ so that such policies merely exacerbated the general hardships
which they were intended to remedy (1997, pg. 111). Additionally, Hawkins contends
that Sumner’s views appeared to make the case that, by eschewing the natural order,
social welfare polices were instrumental in “shifting the burden of the struggle [for
existence] from some classes onto others” (1997, pg. 111). Thus, Sumner’s view of social
welfare policies merely further expressed his notion that the defiance of nature could only
bring dire consequences for all.
However, though these aspects of Sumner’s ideas are important to understanding
the relationship between Sumner and Spencer, Hawkins argues that it is the writings in
which Sumner outlined his “science of society” (1997, pg 115) that are more indicative of
actual social Darwinism (1997, pg 117). In his sociological theories, Sumner explained
how various “unconscious, uniform, invariable and imperative modes of thought and
practice which became the cultural heritage of the group,” or “folkways,” emerged (1997,
pg. 117). According to Hawkins, the significance of Sumner’s notion of the development
of folkways is that Sumner argues that the development of these are guided by the
“struggle for existence” and the “competition for life” (1997, pg. 117). However, as
Hawkins observes, his sociological theories suggest that Sumner believed that “social
evolution” was “analogous” to, rather than “derivative” of, “organic evolution” (Hawkins
1997, pg. 117). Similarly, Hawkins contends that

49

[Sumner] sought to explicate the sources of variation and
conservation and the cultural mechanisms through which
competition and selection took place. He was a determinist because
evolutionary laws were inexorable and unavoidable, but he was not
a biological reductionist in that the laws in question operated in
and through social beliefs, practices and institutions (Hawkins
1997, pg. 117-118).

While Fiske and Sumner were concerned with issues of war and the relationship
of government with society, William James was concerned with demonstrating the
implications of evolutionary theory on science and religion (Hawkins 1997, pg 118).
According to Hawkins, James, along with Charles Sanders Peirce and John Dewey,
regarded Darwin’s evolutionary theory as having significant implications for scientific
method and reasoning (1997, pg 118). James’ pragmatism or pragmatic philosophy
challenged the earlier conceptions of science in which science was regarded as a method
which was employed to achieve certainty, arguing instead that science is, in fact,
“probabilistic” in nature (Hawkins 1997, pg. 118). Thus, James rejected the
“deterministic” vision of science proffered by thinkers such as Spencer or Sumner
(Hawkins 1997, pg. 118). Likewise, this view of science as probability, argues Hawkins,
was directly influenced by Darwinian evolutionism (1997, pg 118). Darwin’s influence is
clearly illustrated in James’ reinterpretation of religious schisms and the emergence of
multiple and competing sects as reflective of evolutionary processes (Hawkins 1997, pg.
119). James applied evolutionary theory to society as well as to religion and science,
contending that evolutionary processes allow for “geniuses” to emerge and thus, guide
“social evolution” in its various directions (Hawkins 1997, pg. 119).
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Thus, despite the differences in the social theories of each of these thinkers that
Hawkins’ assesses, the underlying worldview with which each constructed his respective
theory was guided by notions of biological or scientific determinism (1997).
Additionally, all of these thinkers placed their theories within the context of evolutionary
forces, a fact which, for Hawkins, further illustrates both the significance and the
versatility of social Darwinism in American thought at the turn of the century (1997).

Assessing the Influence of Social Darwinism on the Turn-of-the-Century Court

Although Hawkins provides examples of the influence of social Darwinism in
American thought at the turn of the century, his work does not attempt to examine the
rhetoric of the turn-of-the-century Court. Similarly, Bannister provides no detailed
evaluation of the Courts under his reinterpretation of the impact of Darwinism on turn-ofthe-century thought. Even Hofstadter makes only scant mention of the Court in his text
Social Darwinism in American Thought. However, Hofstadter echoes the orthodox thesis
of the Court in his argument that Spencer’s influence on the Court was clearly reflected
in its adoption of the liberty of contract doctrine and further evidenced by Holmes’
dissent in Lochner, in which Holmes indicted the majority for its predilection for
Spencer’s Social Statics (1944, pg. 46-47). Nevertheless, these examinations of social
Darwinism, and the subsequent controversies regarding this view, do not significantly
address the Court. However, both Bannister’s and Hawkins’ views help to serve as a
starting point for a reexamination of the influence of social Darwinism on the turn-of-thecentury Court.
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In fact, upon reexamination, both the Court’s rhetoric and the outcomes of the
cases, specifically the minimum wage and maximum hours cases, suggest that the Court’s
behavior could be characterized as confused. For example, on the one hand, the Court
proceeded to uphold progressive legislation cases such as Holden, Muller, and West
Coast Hotel. Thus, in these cases, the Court seems undeserving of the social Darwinist
label. On the other hand, the Court overturned many pieces of important progressive
legislation in cases such as Lochner, Morehead, and Adkins, suggesting that it may
deserve the designation of social Darwinist after all. However, though this disparity is
superficially suggestive of confusion, Mike Hawkins’ recent scholarship on social
Darwinism may help to explain how the Court might have taken such disparate positions
in cases dealing with similar pieces of reformist legislation if social Darwinism indeed
constituted a significant influence. To be sure, Hawkins’ recent scholarship suggests that
scientific determinism is a key assumption of social Darwinism and that, because social
Darwinism is a worldview rather than an ideology or a distinct social theory, it is highly
versatile and adaptable to a number of ideologies and social theories including both
reformist (progressive) and conservative social theories. Finally, both the identification of
scientific determinism as the key assumption of social Darwinism and the demonstration
of the versatility of this worldview may help to explain the Court’s apparent vacillation
on progressive legislation with regard to its treatment of minimum wage and maximum
hours statutes.
In Muller, the Court clearly alluded to notions of scientific determinism in its
rationale for upholding the Oregon statute which limited the work hours for laundresses.
Additionally, in West Coast Hotel, the Court plainly suggested that the protection of the
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health and safety of women was clearly within the states’ power because of the weakness
of their bargaining position compared with that of some other classes. However, the
Court in West Coast Hotel did not, as it had in Muller, point to such notions as either
woman’s particular weakness in the struggle for “subsistence” or her unique role in the
survival of humanity in order to underscore the reasons for her special protections.
Nevertheless, the Court made clear that the protection of the health of women is within
the public interest. Thus, though the appeal to the notions of evolutionary forces or
scientific determinism is less apparent in West Coast Hotel than in Muller, the notions are
at least implied by the Court’s allusions to the importance of healthy women in society.
However, the evidence for the influence of evolutionary ideas or scientific determinism
in West Coast Hotel is very weak.
However, though the evidence that the Court was guided by the notion of
scientific determinism is clearly evident in Muller and is somewhat supported by West
Coast Hotel, the rhetorical evidence for the influence of scientific determinism or
evolutionary notions is not as clearly supported by the other cases presented here. Thus,
Hawkins’ recent scholarship could explain the Court’s contrary positions on similar
legislation if it could be shown that the Court was consistently influenced by social
Darwinism. However, this scholarship may not be helpful in demonstrating that the
Court’s vacillation on progressive minimum wage and maximum hours legislation
actually follows from the versatility of this worldview.
Add to this, given Bannister’s revision of the orthodox view on social
Darwinism’s influence in American thought, cases such as Muller or West Coast Hotel
may merely reflect that the Court may have been influenced by the reform characteristics
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of Darwinism—if the Court was influenced by Darwinism at all—rather than by social
Darwinism as it is defined by recent scholars such as Hawkins or earlier scholars such as
Hofstadter. Indeed, these cases may perhaps serve as examples of how Darwinism
influenced the reform movement rather than serving as the antithesis of it. Bannister’s
scholarship, in which he disputes the notion that Darwin’s ideas contributed to the rise of
conservative social theory in America at the turn of the century, presents further
challenges to interpreting the turn-of-the-century Court’s maximum hours and minimum
wage jurisprudence. However, it does not suggest that the Court was not influenced by
this worldview. Instead, it merely diminishes the strength of the case based on the
rhetoric of the cases presented here.
Bannister’s view of the influence of Darwinism on American thought suggests
that Muller is explainable if the Court was influenced by Darwin’s ideas because the
Court upheld reform legislation while apparently being influenced by Darwinian notions.
Furthermore, Bannister’s thesis that Darwinism was influential to reform notions rather
than brutal individualism or extreme conservative social and economic ideologies or
theories appears to be further supported by the fact that explicitly Darwinian notions do
not seem to be the underlying framework for the Court’s decisions in cases such as
Lochner or Adkins, in which the Court dealt major blows to attempts at progressive
reform. Thus, this fact suggests that, at least given the rhetorical evidence from Lochner
and Adkins, the majority of the Court in these cases was influenced by something other
than Darwinism. That is, since Lochner and Adkins appear not to have been influenced by
evolutionary notions, they must have been influenced by other ideas, such as American
traditions or laissez-faire economics, as some scholars have suggested. In fact, the case
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that the Court was influenced by notions of laissez-faire or Spencerian notions of limited
government interference is supported by the rhetoric of several of the cases—The
Slaughterhouse Cases, Munn, Allgeyer, Lochner, Adkins, and West Coast Hotel, for
example. Thus, given Bannister’s thesis, there is not a strong case based on the rhetoric of
the cases presented here that the Court was influenced by Darwinism, except in Muller,
where the majority of the Court appears to be appealing tangentially to evolutionary
notions. Additionally, because of his contention that social Darwinism was a myth,
Bannister’s view may in fact confirm the revisionism of the Court’s behavior, in which it
is argued that the turn-of-the-century Court was influenced by American traditions rather
than social Darwinism.
Despite the differences between Bannister and Hawkins, both scholars’ work
could help to explain Muller or, to a lesser extent, West Coast Hotel. The problem posed
by the other cases, such as Lochner, Adkins, and Morehead, is that they indicate that the
Court might have been influenced by some theory other than Darwinism. If the Court can
be shown to have been influenced by evolutionary ideas, Hawkins’ view could explain
the vacillation or disparity between the Court’s handling of the different cases.
Ultimately, however, the rhetorical evidence from all of the cases presented here apart
from Muller seems not to suggest that evolution or scientific determinism or evolutionary
ideas formed the underlying worldview from which the Court constructed its legal
opinions. However, the opinions themselves perhaps contain insufficient information
from which to construct a clear enough picture of the justices’ worldviews in order to
determine their influences, social Darwinism or otherwise.
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Nevertheless, given Hawkins’ conceptualization of social Darwinism, it at least
appears that the influence of social Darwinism and its progressive influences on the Court
cannot be entirely dismissed. On the other hand, given Bannister’s view, one could
interpret the Court’s behavior in some of its cases as merely reflecting the progressive
traits of Darwinism, thus further demonstrating the inadequacy of the orthodox thesis in
which the Court is labeled social Darwinist. Thus, again, the turn-of-the-century Court’s
behavior may require further study. Indeed, given the Court’s fluctuation on its treatment
of minimum wage and maximum hours legislation and its appeal to scientific
determinism in Muller, the influence of social Darwinism should not be dismissed.
Instead, more insight into the Court’s thinking may be required than that which can be
obtained from the few cases under examination here. Further study of this issue could
perhaps include the justices’ personal papers or writings, from which greater insight into
their worldviews may be gained.
However, the Lochner-era Court and the cases most often cited as evidence of
social Darwinism do not appear to contain substantial evidence of this view.
Nevertheless, the fact that there is little evidence of this view in these cases does not
indicate that social Darwinism was not an influence. Rather, this lack of evidence may
only suggest that the opinions may be an insufficient source to examine for intellectual
influences—social Darwinism or otherwise. Perhaps the limitations of the opinions, as
sources for determining intellectual influences, derive from the institutional constraints
on the Court itself. That is, because the Court’s opinions are couched in the language of
the law and must derive their power from precedent, legal principles, or the Constitution
rather than from the justices’ personal social or economic philosophies, the Court’s
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rhetoric may be limited as a source for examining the justices’ worldviews. Though the
justices’ personal philosophies may guide their decisions in practice, the opinions of the
Court are intended to be grounded in the law, so that the Court’s opinions may provide
few insights into the justices’ extra-legal or extra-constitutional intellectual antecedents
or influences. Thus, while the opinions may be of some use in assessing the justices’
legal antecedents and legal influences, any research of the Court based solely on the
opinions themselves will encounter significant limitations when the researcher attempts
to go beyond legal assessments. Indeed, the project presented here reflects these
limitations. Nevertheless, it appears that the influence of social Darwinism on the turn-ofthe-century Court is an open question which, like the term ‘social Darwinism’ itself—at
least, as Hawkins suggests—refuses to go away.

Conclusion

The turn-of-the-century Court has been accused of social Darwinism by a number
of critics. However, revisionists have explained the Court’s behavior as following from
American traditions rather than from social Darwinism. Nevertheless, critics have
demonstrated that the revisionists’ interpretations of the evidence are faulty and thus
maintain that the Court was indeed social Darwinist.
This controversy over whether the turn-of-the-century Court was social Darwinist
is further complicated by the fact that, not unlike the contention surrounding both the
activism of the turn-of-the-century Court and its influences, there is a great deal of
contention over social Darwinism as well. Although recent scholarship on social
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Darwinism reconciles many of these problems related to this lack of consensus, even this
recent scholarship is problematic in light of the cases presented here because the rhetoric
of the cases which have been most cited as evidence of social Darwinism appear to
contain little indication of the influence of Darwinian or evolutionary ideas. This is
problematic whether one assesses the turn-of-the-century minimum wage and maximum
hours cases under Hawkins’ view or under Bannister’s view. To illustrate, if one assesses
these cases in light of Bannister, it appears that these cases merely confirm both of
Bannister’s contentions that social Darwinism in American thought is a myth and that
Darwinism bolsters reform rather than conservative ideas. Thus, if one interprets the
Court in light of Bannister, the Court does not appear to be the bastion of social
Darwinism that some critics have suggested. Likewise, if one examines the Court in light
of Hawkins’ reinterpretation of social Darwinism, there appears to be little indication that
social Darwinism was the underlying worldview in the rhetoric of the turn-of-the-century
Court’s construction or use of the liberty of contract doctrine. In fact, only the rhetoric
from Muller suggests that the Court may have been guided by anything approaching a
social theory informed by Darwinian discourse.
Nevertheless, though there appears to be very little evidence that the turn-of-thecentury-Court was influenced by social Darwinism, I believe that the thesis that social
Darwinism influenced the Court should not be dismissed entirely. Instead, the limitations
of the Court’s opinions as sources for researching the Court’s intellectual antecedents
present significant problems for assessing the Court’s extra-legal or extra-constitutional
influences. Thus, the issue of the influence of social Darwinism on the turn-of-thecentury Court requires further research. Such research might draw from other sources,
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which should include, but should not be grounded exclusively in, the Court’s legal
opinions. Nevertheless, at least within the rhetoric of the minimum wage and maximum
hours cases themselves, there is little reason to believe that social Darwinism was a
significant influence, if it was influential at all, or played any substantial role in the
jurisprudence of the so-called Lochner-era Court.
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